Risk analysis has gained popularity as a scientific tool to determine the magnitude and probability of an adverse effect associated with a technology or human activity. The use of risk analyses for policy purposes requires efforts to communicate risk information to decision makers, stakeholders, and the general public. Many decision makers and risk analysts must face the inability of most people to understand, assimilate, and process probabilistic risk information. Common sense usually relies on deterministic thinking: a technology is either safe or unsafe, a medical treatment effective or useless, a pollutant perilous or innocuous (Ruckelshaus 1982).
o. Renn assessed probabilities or magnitudes of the risk but without opting for the elimination of the risk source (and thereby drawing fierce opposition by the proponent of the facility). Different grades of safety or health allow for collective bargaining and negotiations, both essential processes in the licensing and regulatory procedure (Renn 1985) .
In addition, risk analysts and managers may use risk communication as a means to learn from the public by listening to the concerns of local residents, public interest groups, and informed citizens. Public input is necessary to include risk-related properties other than magnitude and probability. Issues such as equity of risk bearing, catastrophic versus routine occurrence of losses, the circumstances of risk, and the ability of institutions to monitor and control hazardous facilities are excluded from formal risk analysis and hence not reflected by any risk calculation. Potential victims have a much better sense of risky situations and can communicate their concerns and observations to risk managers or regulators. Both information inputs -the scientific assessment of the probabilities as well as the public perception of the circumstances of the risk-bearing situation -are necessary elements of a rational decision-making process. Risk communication, in both directions, is crucial to society's ability to cope with risk (Kasperson 1986) .
But bow should risk communication be designed to meet tbe functions of enlightenment (orientation knowledge), enhancement of personal protection, conflict resolution, and policy input via two·way communication? Are in· struments available that are attractive for citizens and at the same time effective for conveying the basic ideas of risk analysis?
This chapter describes and analyzes the experiences with "Planning Cells", a novel instrument of public participation designed to convey scientific information to groups oflaypersons and to elicit their preferences with respect to policy options. All functions of risk communication were involved, but most emphasis is placed on the two-way communication process. Most of the findings presented here are derived from a large-scale experiment in the Federal Republic of Germany; the purpose of which was to use planning cells as a means to assess and evaluate different energy scenarios for the Federal Republic of Germany (Renn 1986; Renn et al. 1984; Renn et al. 1985) .
A similar effort was undertaken in 1988 for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. This study applied the method of planning cells for eliciting citizen's preferences for regulatory options with respect to land application of sludge. Since the project was still in progress at the time of writing this chapter, this chapter focuses on the results of the West-German experiment. At the end, however, it addresses also the results of the New Jersey project to discuss some of the impressions gained from applying the use of planning cells in the U.S. context.
Design and methodology
In August 1982, the German Ministry of Research and Technology initiated a large research project to investigate the preferences of the German population with respect to four energy policy options developed by a parliamentary commission in 1979. The Govemment was interested in eliciting reliable information on which energy scenario was most appealing to the population and on what basis citizens would evaluate the policy options laid out in each scenario. A research team directed by the author conducted a three-year study to collect data on public preferences and to analyze the motivations and underlying reasons for the judgmental process of evaluating the predefined energy scenarios. The study comprised three steps:
-Values and criteria to assess and evaluate energy options were identified by interviewing representatives of ten major stake-holder groups in West Germany (Keeney, Renn, and von Winterfeldt 1987 ). -Around 30 energy experts were asked to give their best scientific estimates for the performance of each energy scenario on each of the revealed criteria (Renn 1984 ). -The resulting profiles of each energy scenario were conveyed to randomly selected citizens for evaluation and comment (Renn 1986 ).
For the purpose of this analysis, only the third step is of significance. Asking a sample of the public directly what they think about the four scenarios would have been of limited value. One of the main shortcomings of public opinion polls for determining public preferences and policy evaluations is the inability of most respondents to assess the likely consequences of their own judgments. Since many people associate quite a few false assumptions and incorrect impacts with different energy systems and others do not know how to react because they are confused by the ongoing scientific debate, it was necessary to educate our sample of respondents prior to recording their judgment. Informing people about the likely consequences of their preference in advance involves the danger of manipUlation, in particular of triggering biased responses according to the information presented and the basic attitudes ofthe instructing experts. To avoid biased responses, we invited experts with different attitudes, in panicular about nuclear energy, to review our basic material and to design the curriculum together with us. The material was divided into three categories: basic factual knowledge that all experts could agree on, interpretation of facts (for example, what does an emission of x amount of Y mean in terms of public health?), where we tried to include the most significant viewpoints, and evaluation of facts (for example, will civil liberties be endangered by nuclear energy?) that we reported in brief essays. The consulted experts as well as the participants assured us that they did not detect any bias in the information and that they thought all relevant positions well represented. In addition to the written material and lecture outlines, we invited experts with different points of view to participate in a hearing before the citizen panels. The audience also viewed videotapes of the main arguments.
The idea was to engage citizens in a procedure similar to a jury trial. Formal hearings, lectures, videofilms, inspection tours. written information. and mu· tual discussions provided the informational basis for reaching a well·balanced judgment on the options available. The specific method of using such citizen's panels for policy making was developed by P.C. Dienel (1980 Dienel ( , 1987 at the University of Wuppertal and successfully applied in local and regional plan· ning problems. The study on national energy problems was the first applica· tion of this method for designing national policies.
Dienel assigned the teno "planning cells" to the citizen panels. A planning cell consists of a group of citizens who are selected by a random process and are given paid leave from their workday obligations for a limited period of time in order to work out solutions for given, soluble planning problems with the assistance of advisors on procedure.
A small group (usually 25 people) is assembled to work on a predefined task taking advantage of group dynamics and the absence of traditional social control mechanisms (such as status and hierarchy) . Since the participants are selected by a random procedure, they are not necessarily individually affected by the planning problems to be solved. To encourage participation and person· al commitment, they are assigned the socially highly esteemed role of a "consultant" in the public planning process.
In our study we operated with 24 planning cells drawn from seven communi· ties in different parts of West Genoany. The planning cell meetings were held in public buildings for four consecutive days. Naturally not all persons who were asked to take part in the procedure were able to attend. Only 20 percent of all invited persons did participate, so that a true representation of tbe West German public was not accomplished. But a comparison of the basic demographics of our participants with the national average revealed that our sample was a good representation of the different age groups, income classes, and educational backgrounds. The only clear bias involved the distribution of professions. Hardly any self-employed person was able to sacrifice four days, whereas housewives, retired people, and public servants were slightly overrepresented. For purposes of this chapter on risk communication, this nonrepresentative sample composition is more of an advantage, since persons with no background in probabilistic risk assessment comprised the vast majority of our sample.
The objective of the study was to elicit preferences of our participants and to lead them to evaluate the different options by taking into account the best scientific estimates of the likely impacts of each option and their personal value judgments. The task for each panicipant was hence to rate each energy system according to the given criteria, to assign relative weights to each criterion, and to come up with a balanced recommendation as to which energy scenario should be implemented to meet future energy demands. Therefore, our data collection clearly focused on the weighting of eriteria and the evaluation of energy options. But we also tested, at least indirectly, several concepts of communicating probabilistic information and were able to reconstruct some major pathways of how individuals assimilate and process risk-related infonnation.
The structure of risk commuolcation in tbe planning cells
More than a year of preparation was invested to design an appropriate agenda for the four days and to train the advisors and expens for their task of communicating the nature, benefits, and risks of different energy systems and scenarios. Since at that time similar projects combining education and participation in energy policy making were lacking or at least not completed (Sweden and the Netherlands have conducted citizens panel discussions on energy politics but had not published the results in 1982), the design of our infonnation program relied upon existing studies on risk and technology. In addition, we conducted four pretests involving different curricula for the planning cell procedure. A review of the literature led us to acknowledge the major difficulties of communicating risk-related infonnation. In particular, psychometric and attitudinal studies prompted us to confront a series of problems: -Inaccurate perception of the meaning of probabilities;
Overconfidence in one's OWn ability to manage and control risky situations; -Thirst and desire for scientific certainty and unanimity among experts;
Tendency to underestimate natural and to overestimate technological (human made) risks -Reluctance to make trade-offs between different types of risks or risk sources;
-Fear of unfamiliar, low-probability high-consequence risk sources Strong preoccupation with risk-related factors such as equity, voluntariness, and societal ability to manage and control risk source.
In addition to problems in the ability and willingness of the individual to understand and process risk-related infonnation (see Chapter 5), we summa- 10 particular, we were aware that most risk experts equate the term risk with average annual mortality whereas laypersons associate different meanings with the term risk depending on the context and incorporate several independent dimensions when evaluating the riskiness of an activity or event (as outlined in Table 19 .1). Furthermore,laypersons tend to show less concern for statistically calculated victims (such as one out of a thousand) as opposed to identifiable individuals (My neighbor will die as a result of activity V). Statistical losses seem ooly to matter if individuals can picture themselves or close relatives and friends as potential victims (Royal Society 1983) . As a result of our review of the literature, we developed a set of guidelines, summarized in Table 19 .2, for our experts and instructors.
The guidelines for risk communicators were reviewed by experts on risk communication. For the more specific question of how to frame our information process and what kind of channels and media we should utilize, we conducted a pretest with four planniogcells, each consisting of25 persons. The groups received the same substantial information, but in four different ways:
I. The first group was informed by a proponent and an opponent about each of the controversial energy systems. A panel discussion among the communicators and with the audience was scheduled after each individual expert had the chance to present his or her arguments. 2. The second group received from a "neutral" expert information on the technical characteristics of the energy systems. A panel discussion with pro and con experts followed. 3. The third group was also informed by a neutral expert prior to a hearing in which the audience interviewed experts, representatives of interest groups, and politicians about their arguments concerning the different policy options and energy systems. 4. The fourth group was again given technical information first. Instead of a panel discussion, however, the audience viewed videotapes containing statements of leading pro and con experts.
The test of our information strategies does not satisfy the requirements for an experimental design. rlfSt, a real control group is missing, and, second, not aU combinations of presenting the information were included. But time and money constraints precluded the pretests exceeding more than four experi- mental groups. Thus we decided to use four different combinations of information strategies that we thought were most likely to fit weU together. By coUecting the evaluation for each segment of the communication program, however, we were able to judge the relative preference for each option. Our respondents were asked to evaluate the communication effort on a semantic differential instrument dealing with different evaluative categories (e.g. objectivity, clarity, completeness, adequacy, and consistency). It should he noted that we did not test factual knowledge or comprehenSion of the material presented. Rather, we focused on the subjective impression of our respondents.
The results were astonishingly unambiguous. The rating for strategy 4 dominated clearly all other alternatives. With the exception of diversity of viewpoints and comprehensiveness, the combination of technical expertise and videofilm was perceived as superior in aU other categories. Table 19 .3 summarizes the major advantages of videotaping expert controvenies.
Since our respondents missed the liveliness of a panel discussion and questioned the completeness of the information received, we combined strategies 3 and 4 and composed a three-step information sequence. Fint, a technical expert, prepared to present only material that in the previous expert ratings received unanimous agreement, lectured for approximately 30 minutes about TlIble 19.2. GuideliDes for risk communication.
-SpcQ/y your iDleotiooa aod goals "' the bcgiDain& of each pm<otatioD. Questions for clarification were also bandied by the present expen, but closely supervised by the group advisor to avoid any biases. In a third step, a bearing was conducted with members of the main political panies (including the Greens) where the participants of the planning cells could raise prepared and spontaneous questions. In addition, all participants received the results of our expen survey and the list of the values revealed in our interrogation of stakeholder groups. The panicipants were randomly assigned to small discussion and working groups of five to digest the material, diseuss potential applications, and prepare questions for the politicians.
To avoid the danger of overtaxing or overcommitting our respondents, we implemented the fun information sequence ooly for the two most controversial energy systems: nuclear and solar energy. For tbe four energy scenarios, which basically differed in their utilization rate of nuclear versus solar energy and conservation, videofilms were not prepared because most arguments were already covered in tbe films on the two controversial energy systems. -Each expert is given the aa.mc time allowance and thus was treated equally and fairly.
-Tbe statements caD be lltUCturcd accordin, to a prepared outline 1LIhic:b is developed by or disawed 1LIitb the citizeD panels.
-Vr.deotapes can be replayed 5everal times 10 that difficult argumeats c:ao be viewed more than 0""'. 
Results of the communication elTort
Indiauors of success and failure: How well was the information on risks and benefits of different energy scenarios and systems perceived? In which way did we succeed in conveying the basic rationale of risk assessment? How did people incorporate risk judgments in their overall evaluation of energy options? Unfortunately, we cannot provide sufficient statistical evidence to respond to these questions. Since our objective was to elicit preferences and evaluations of energy systems, we did not specifically ask for opinions or ratings of the different information procedures and contents. Therefore, we bad to rely on more indirect data sources and in some instances on personal impressions. We gained insights about tbe effectiveness and results of our communication effort from a variety of sources:
-We asked eacb respondent to make trade-<lffs between different risk sources and to design compensation strategies for those people wbo would be worse off if the respondent's preferred option were chosen. Risk-related data were given to perform this task. Without an understanding and an appreciation of the risk assessment method, this task was impossible to perform. Each respondent made risk-related assessments with respect to health and safety as well as environmental qUality. From these data, one can infer the way probabilistic information was processed. Content analysis was used to investigate the major arguments brought forward by each participant to justify his or her final decision on which scenario should serve as the major guideline for national energy policy making. From these data, the percentage of risk related information was extracted. -All advisors on procedure (two for each planning cell) as well as the student assistants (also two for each planning cell) bad to fill out an evaluation form that elicited an assessment of the overt errects of each information sequence.
The author participated in six of the 24 planning cells and gained an impressionistic view as to whicb kind of information was readily accepted and digested and which was rejected or ignored. Since most planning cell runs were videotaped, these impressions could be substantiated by watching similar information sequences.
The results fall into two basic categories: the perception of risk-related information, and the processing oftbis information to articulate and justify one's own judgment.
Perception of risk-related info171Ultion:
The rationale of risle assessment was understood and also appreciated as a viable tool of decision making. The need to assign trade-<>ffs to conflicting values and to consider differences in probabilities as one yardstick for evaluating the seriousness of consequences was reflected in the numerical responses of the participants for assessing and weighting healtb, safety , and environmental impacts. None of the respondents refused to assign trade-<>ffs, even between adverse health effects and costs, nor were low-probability, high-<:onsequence events always seen as inferior to more probable, but less severe incidents. 1bis finding contradicts the theoretical implication of some cultural analysts of risk perception who claim that people attached to the environmental movement are not willing to accept tbe rationale of making trade-<>ffs between environmental quality and other categories (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsley 1982) . Our results seem to indicate, at least for panels of randomly selected citizens, that the rejection oftrade-<>ffs is more a question of stralegic bargaining Ihan a matter of personal conviction. Also, our respondenls, facing fellow citizens with divergenl viewpoints, accepled Ihe legitimacy of each value calegory and thus conceded thaI decisions should nol be made on the basis of Ihe criteria thaI each individual respondent deemed importanl. 1bis, of course, may be attributed 10 the lack of opeoIy documented commitments thaI may prevenl members of slakeholder groups from accepting in public the legitimacy of Ihe values of other groups. Uncommitted citizens do nol "lose face" when they tolerate and even appreciale viewpoints contrary 10 their own. Furthermore, these citizens felt the need 10 incorporate values of other citizens inlO the decision making process even if these values were in opposition to their own values.
One of the reasons that most participants could handle difficult trade-<>ff problems and deal with probabilities was their familiarity with budget constraints in their everyday lives (Fiscbhoff, Svenson, and Slovic 1986) . Most participants had first hand experience with budget constraints and hence for making trade-<>ffs between costs and safety. Again, the common misconception that most people arc unwiIling or unable to accept the premise of commensurability of money and health effects should be reconsidered in the light of our experiences. Many respondents reported on their own constraints when trading gains or losses of safety against prices of goods. Buying a car equipped with effective, but expensive safety features versus purchasing an inexpensive, but less safe vehicle, for example, constiluted a common dilemma that many respondenls had faced in the pasl. The variance of trade-<>ffs actually assigned between the two calegories was very high, thus causing considerable debate and conflict among the participants. However, not a single person refused 10 make this Irade-<>ff, or even expressed doubts aboul the value of this proce-dure. The high compliance rate was certainly facilitated by the group interaction and the assigned roles of the panicipants as public consultants. Yet it appears that, within an intensive and well-structured communication process, the idea of relative safety can be successfully conveyed.
Although taken into account, probabilities were more difficult to communicate, particularly for the purpose of evaluating outcomes. Most participants had an abstract idea of probabilities, but the concrete meaning and instrumental application of probability concepts were difficult to impan. On the one hand, risk sources characterized by different probabilities of a specific adverse effect (e. g. loss of tite) were indeed assessed and evaluated differently, so that probabilities were certainly considered. On the other hand, the catastrophic potential of a risk source dominated clearly the overall estimation of riskiness.
Nuclear energy received an overall negative evaluation for the corresponding health impacts, even though it scored positively in almost all subcategories constituting the health risk category (i.e.occupational health hazards, average fatalities, morbidity, nonfatal health effects). Negative assessments were assigned only to the subcategory catastrophic potential. In the process of amalgamating the five subcategories of health risk into one dimension, the positive average fatality scores were all overcompensated by the perception of the catastrophic potential. This is the only logical explanation for the composite negative judgment. The mean over the five subcategories is significantly lower than the value assigned to the composite effect. Using a simple tinear regression analysis, the weight for the catastrophic potential must be 0.7 at least in order to compensate the scores of the other four subcategories. This result is not surprising, at least in principle, since risk perception studies have demonstrated the importance of the catastrophic potential for individual perception of riskiness. But the magnitude of this effect was unexpectedly high.
More recent research on risk perception attributes the high sensitivity to catastrophic potential to the public concern for society's ability to cope with large accidents and its capability to control potentially dangerous technol· ogies. It also suggests that the expected or perceived number of victims in a single accident is only slightly correlated with perceived riskiness of such an event (e.g. , Reno 1983). Our results seem to underline this hypothesis since the more numerical subcategories of average losses were perceived as much less important than the composite effect of one catastrophe.
Furthermore, technologies with high catastrophic potential were perceived as more inequitable than technologies with more frequent, but less dramatic effects. Although experts have demonstrated that low-probability. high-ronsequence risks are usually more equitable than high·frequency, low-ronsequence risks (Keeney 1980) . most panicipants believed the contrary. They were convinced that a rare event would more likely affect the "innocent" bystanders or even future generations, whereas the beneficiaries of such technologies would probably ~get away with it".
The understanding of probability was clearly analogous to perceived risks taking in economic ventures. The perception here is that managers who are risking the fate of the whole company for making profits may benefit tremendously in the short run, but will ruin the company in the long run. The lower the probability of the financial ruin, the more likely it is that the immediate beneficiaries will not experience this fate but their successors will. Since enough anecdotal evidence exists for such delayed costs of short-term profitseeking, it was almost impossible to convey the mathematical concept of probability independence with regard to time and previous outcomes. Overwhelmingly, people were convinced that the probability of a catastrophe would increase with every year the catastrophe did not occur. Under this premise, future generations are inevitably more at risk than the present generations even though they may not enjoy the benefits. Simply stated, after three occurrences of tails in tossing coins, most people believe that it is more probable to obtain heads in a fourth trial than tails.
One attempt to make probabilities more comprehensible to the participants was the use of risk comparisons. By putting risks into perspective, the objective of the communication process, as reviewed in Chapter S, was to compare the risks of known and familiar risk sources to new and controversial risks. Such comparisons were perceived in an ambivalent manner. When experts focused on the consequence of a risk as the common denominator for the comparison, such as the probability of getting lung cancer from smoking versus living next to a coal-fired power station, the panel reacted with incomprehension or even anger. The panels accepted only comparisons among risks of equifunctional systems, such as power generating facilities. Not even then did the average score of the individual risk assessment reflect the numerical distance between the scientific probability estimates.
In essence, our approach succeeded in conveying the underlying rationale of risk analysis and in explaining the meaning of probabilities and models for determining adverse effects. The participants also obtained an understanding of the problems of regulatory agencies, particularly seeking an adequate balance between avoiding negative health effects and fostering economic prosperity. Nevertheless, the average probability estimates had only a minor impact on the rating of the seriousness of health and environmental effects. The average expected fatality rate was clearly understood and also appreciated as a means of classifying risk, but the catastrophic potential was perceived as the major and dominant contributor to the perceived seriousness of a risk. This result has some interesting implications:
o. Renn 
I. The majority of our sample does not s/"m the underlying value judgmenl in technical risk analysis to give equal weight to probability and magnitude and not to dif/erenJiaJe between a low-probability, high-consequence and highprobability, low-consequence risk having the same expected value.
Although our sample is not a true representation of the West German population and the scope of risk sources was restricted to energy systems, the unanimity of rejecting average annual fatalities as a yardstick to evaluate risk suggests a clear divergence between expert and layperson judgments. Expected values were neither ignored nor misunderstood; they were simply assigned a minor importance in evaluating risk. This conclusion bas been confirmed by almost all survey results on risk perception (see references in Table 19 .2).
The divergence between risk experts and laypersom is not caused by public ignorance or misunderstanding of the probability concept bus appears to be rooted in different underlying value judgmenlS.
Whereas experts rate the seriousness of risks as a function of the number of victims per time unit, the majority of laypersons focuses on the worst conceivable incident and the dispersion of risk among different groups (equity issue). We bad advised our instructors to empbasize the importance of equity issues and other risk-related qualities. Therefore, the inclination of our sample to assign bigher weights to the distribution and circumstances of risk may well be attributable to, or at least be influenced by our information program. But as most reports of the group advisors indicated, tbe importance of the probability concept was actually appreciated most when the instructor or the contestants during the hearing voiced their support for a broader definition of risk and favored the inclusion of qualitative aspects of risk. In this case, the participants of the planning cells did not perceive the need to compensate for the unidimensional expert opinion and were willing "generously· to assign at least a moderate weight to average losses over time. Hence, we believe that in spite of the tendency to ignore or underestimate the relative importance of probabilities, most participants could be persuaded to consider annual risk figures more carefully, but only if experts or politicians are equally willing to include the public concern for qualitative risk characteristics in their risk analyses or policies.
Public information programs on risk will ineviJllbly fail if the objective is to enlice people to evalUlJle risks according to expected values.
Since the difference in experts' and laypersons' understanding of risk is not attributable to the lack of knowledge but to value differences in the interpretation and evaluation of risk-related situations, value cbanges would be necessary to influence public risk perception. Regardless of bow well an information program may be designed, it is unlikely to succeed in altering the basic values underlying the public perception of risl<. First, value changes are extremely difficult to induce by information programs (McGuire 1985) . Second, the public may well underestimate the value of probabilistic risk analyses for evaluating the seriousness of risk; but with the same degree of legitimacy, one can claim that the expert's understanding of risk underestimates the important circumstances of the risk situation and ilS institutional bandling. Hence, both sides operate under a limited perspective (English 1987) . Third, having good arguments available to confirm their viewpoint, most people do not have any incentive to cbange their value structure and adopt a new concept of risk evaluation. Finally, there is always sufficient anecdotal evidence to substantiate one's own judgment, whereas direct proof for the expert's concept is difficult to present because risk-related events are obviously stochastic and therefore predictable only on the basis of large numbers of events. Catastrophic events arc rare, however, and the hypothetical assessment offailure probabilities (through fault-tree analysis, for example) does not provide any forecast for tbe performance of an individual plant. TMI or Cbemobyl neither prove nor disprove the probability estimates of risk analyses, because single evenlS may occur any time even for low-probability events. Thus it may even be politically reasonable in managing risk to substitute probability estimates with social or institutional ability to control bazardous technologies (as public perception would suggest). In addition to the question of bow risks were actually perceived by the participants of the planning cells and what kind of infonnation was accepted and processed, we were also interested in attitude fonnation . All our respondents had been asked to select one of the four energy scenarios and to justify their selection. What arguments were reproduced or even originated to back up individual decisions, and how did risk-related infonnation influence this process? Almost all participants assigned rather high weights to health and safety and to environmental quality. Energy systems perceived as detrimental to health or environment received negative, or at least ambivalent evaluations, even if the economic benefits earned high ratings. The relative importance of the two risk impact factors became even more prominent when respondents were divided into three major subgroups:
Communication
1. Maltrialists (persons who assign bighest values to economic benefits and prosperity); 2. Post-materialists (persons who assign highest value to environmental quality); 3. Persons with mixed omnllltion (Inglehart 1977) .
The materialists in our sample ranked environmental quality almost as high as their favored economic perfonnance standards (d . Table 19 .4). Thus, they faced a true value conflict between the two subsets of values. In contrast to them, the post-materialists assigned extremely high weights to environmental quality and only marginal values to economic perfonnance (with the exception of "assuring employment"), in particular costs. Both extreme groups were willing to make trade-offs, but the materialists, probably frustrated by the ongoing positive amplification of environmental quality as a highly appreciat- • Respondeots were uked 10 Ulip numerical weights to each of the eight dimensions. The sum of tile weigh" OIIIOUIII to 100. · ed social value (social desirability concept), were more inclined to trade off their prior values than the post-materialists who were weD aware of the public support for their concerns. Hence they were less wiUing to sacrifice their environmental concern for an increase of economic benefits. Furthermore, most post-materialists were convinced that, in the long run, environmentaUy innocuous energy systems would also prove more cost-effective, whereas the materialists acknowledged a strong value conflict between environment and economics. The intermediate group assigned higher values to environmental concerns than to economic ones, but was rather flexible and more relaxed in making trade-<lffs. But every person in our sample assigned higher or equal weight to health safety than to any of the economic categories. Probabilistic risk analysis enjoyed little use in backing up or chaUenging participants' viewpoints or arguments. Conceding that nuclear energy is risky and hazardous, proponents defended their positive attitude by referring to the economic benefits of this energy source that would outweigh its negative impact on health and environment. Only IS out of almost 500 participants mentioned that the probability of a severe accident was very smaD and that the risk therefore was acceptable. Apparently, risk analyses were not used as an argument to back up a pronuclear position.
As mentioned above, the economic variables were awarded less importance than bealth, safety, and environmental quality during the formal procedure of assigning weights to eacb category. Consequently, the ealculated preference (sum of weighted attributes) implied a larger proportion of negative attitudes towards nuclear power than revealed by direct questioning or content analysis of narrative justifications of one's own judgment (Renn et al. 1984) . The discrepancy between the ealculated preference (strongly antinuclear) and the verbaDy expressed preference (more in favor of nuclear energy) could be partly explained by the social desirability effect (many people felt social pressure to assign higher weights to sociaUy desirable and "altruistic" goals such as environmental quality and less weigbt to "egoistic" and more materialistic goals sucb as cost-effectiveness although they personally found the latter more important), partly by referring to peer group judgments (political parties, unions, scientists, etc.) whicb were believed to have more competence in evaluating the need and acceptability of nuclear power.
The opponents of nuclear energy needed no probabilities on whicb to base their arguments. They believed that nuclear energy was uneronomieal in the first place so tbat a balancing between risk and benefit would be superfluous (due to the lack of benefits). The group of undecided persons regarded botb, the risks and the benefits to be high, but had difficulties in mentaUy assigning the trade-<lfls between the two. They favored a policy in which aU other energy sources .should be used as much as tcchnieally and eoonomicaUy feasible.
Nuclear energy sbould be restricted to meeting the residual demand. A group stating that the risk is negligible or small was essentially missing.
The limits of oommunication were even more visible in two other areas. During our expert survey on assessing impacts of different energy systems, professional proponents and opponents of nuclear energy and solar energy agreed tbat solar energy is more labor-intensive and thus probably more expensive, however beneficial to employment, and that radiation escaping from a nuclear power station in normal operation would not lead to detrimental environmental consequences.
This information was passed on to the participants in oral and written form. Despite the unanimous support of these two statements by the adversarial science camps, most participants rejected them, apparently because tbey contradicted central elements of their attitudes. Research on attitude change has long established the finding that even overwhelming evidence by reference groups are not sufficient to change salient components of a person's belief structure (McGuire 1985; Chaiken and Stangor 1987) .
The proponents of nuclear energy refused to believe that solar energy migbt increase direct employment in the energy sector. Opponents remained steadfast in their beliefs that nuclear power plants have a devastating effect on the environment. In both instances, the underlying pattern of attitudes would have been scattered if the information were adopted. Already admitting that nuclear energy is hazardous, the prnponents could bardly concede that any economic benefit is linked with solar energy, thus challenging the economic superiority of nuclear energy. The antinuclear group, strongly motivated by its environmental concern, was unable to link any environmental advantage with nuclear energy. Regardless of whether the experts' statements were indeed right or not, this example illustrates a mechanism that social psychologists have denoted as avoidance of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) . If a central element of an important attitude is challenged by incoming devious information, the most likely escape is either to reject the information or regard the source of this information as biased or misinformed. This way one may sustain the existing attitude and avoid the painful process of redirecting the belief system.
Yet it would leave a totally wrong impression to infer that during the four days of planning cell procedure, changes in attitudes or beliefs did not occur. Most respondents indicated that they corrected many false assumptions about energy systems and even changed parts of their belief system. Such changes, however, were reported only for energy systems or sources with low emotional involvement. The more unstructured attitudes were articulated and the less they were linked with basic values and commitments, the more often they were changed in the course of the planning ceO. Highly politicized energy options, such as nuclear energy or conservation, triggered a strong attitudinal commitment that seemed almost impossible to overcome or alter. The presented information in these cases served as a supermarket for selecting good arguments to rationalize prior commitments. Since arguments for both sides were presented, every participant was able to select the information that be or she wanted to hear. Information on less debated energy systems (such as coal gasification or fusion), bowever, was readily adopted, openly discussed, and incorporated into the existing value framework for energy policies.
In essence, risk information was effective in laying the ground for a rational and well-balanced attitude towards a risk source not yet associated with strong personal value patterns and belief systems. Risk communication efforts are, therefore, most effective early on, before people have committed themselves to one position or another. U that commitment has become fixed, new information is not likely to cbange it. Rather information is used to collect new arguments and to back up one's own position; contradicting evidence is usuaUy rejected. Either personal experience or a combination of powerful evidence and changes of reference group judgments are necessary to reverse stronglyheld attitudinal commitments.
Experiences with the New Jersey project
In 1988, the Department of Environmental Protection of New Jersey decided to fund a research project to apply the methods of planning cells to an U.S. audience. The objective of this study has been to elicit regulatory options for land application of sludge. In November 1988, two planning cells were conducted. The process conveyed additional insights into the communication problems and opportunities in the context of a different subject and a different political cuhure.
Drawing upon our West German education program, we designed the American process in a similar way. We conducted an expert workshop on the risks and regulations of land application of sludge and videotaped aU controversial statements. These statements, together with written information material and lectures, were presented to the audience. In addition, we handed out the numerical results of the expert workshop summarizing the experts' judgments on the seriousness of risks and the appropriateness of existing regulations.
Although probabilistic information was part of the education package, it played a less important role than in the West German energy study. The focus of our informational material was on the regulatory provisions and their effectiveness. We also faced hardly any controversy among the experts about tbe seriousness of the risks. Witb tbe exception of the risks of organic toxins, all experts expressed rather similar assessments of the risks and felt that health effects were negligible provided that all the regulations were met.
When we implemented tbe information program with the participants ofthe two planning cells, we were confronted with two major difficulties. First, the participants were outraged about the task of designing and evaluating regulation since tbey were fundamentally opposed to having land application of sludge in their neighborhood at all. Second, the participants complained about the selection procedure and were only willing to cooperate if all the abutters to the proposed land application site were invited to participate. Such a request transformed the planning cell into a direct citizen stakeholder group. After two days of difficult negotiations, the participants decided to run the planning cells by themselves and to inform the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection about their preferences. On January IS , 1989, they sent a report to the Department stating that they were fundamentally opposed to the plan of land application and that they were willing to fight should the Department try to implement its plans.
In spite of the unexpected change of the agenda and the structure of the planning cells, our information package seemed to have had an impact on the participants since some of the problems mentioned in their final document reflected paragraphs from the information material. The citizens also requested to bave the videotapes available for their sessions. During the two days of discussion, the participants took advantage of all the prepared lectures and engaged in lengthy discussions with the presenters. They refused, bowever, to work on the task of evaluating regulations since that was obviously not in their interest. It was clear that our information served primarily as a means to rationalize and justify the decision to reject the land application project, but at the same time it helped to correct unreasonable fears and to focus on issues tbat posed real concerns.
The most important result in terms of risk communication was the fact that, through the process of elicitation and discussion, the concerns of the citizens became clearer to us and to the funding agency. Our expectation was that citizen would he most worried about potential health effects and odor problems. Although both aspects were raised as concerns during the initial discussions, the emphasis of the citizens was on the transformation of farmland to an industrial "waste dump' (regardless of the risks involved) and the long tenn effect of sludge application on the quality of the soil. To imagine that, due to cumulative concentration of heavy metals, fannland might he unsuited for further agricultural purposes after 30-40 years of sludge application was most scaring for the fanners in the planning cells. FmaUy new residents of the area were concerned about economic and social impacts ranging from the elevated noise level because of truck traffic to the expected decline of property values. All three clusters of concerns are hardly addressed in the present New Jersey regulations. Thus the two-way communication process belped to gain a better insight of the citizens' concerns and to provide a better platform to matcb these concerns with new, improved regulation or planning.
Conclusions
This chapter has described tbe process of risk communication in planning cells conducted in West Germany in the years [1982] [1983] [1984] . In addition, we presented some more recent insights from a planning cell project in New Jersey. We analyzed the factors that proved to bave influenced tbe effectiveness and failures of our communication efforts. It should be kept in mind that all our insights in risk communication are based ooly partly on statistical evidence; they were also derived from subjective judgment as an observer of the planning cell procedures. 10 addition, our communication program was designed for a highly artificial situation. Randomly selected citizens were given paid leave from their workday obligations to evaluate national energy policies. Yet, the intensive interaction between researcher and researcb subjects, the opportunity to reacb a subgroup of the population usually not included in other forms of participation, and tbe direct access to measuring the success or failure of our information program created a unique and rewarding researcb experience that yielded valuable results diffieultto obtain otherwise. Furthermore, our respondents were highly motivated to meet their role requirements as "value consultants" and to respond to our questions honestly and with a high sense of responsibility not likely to be found in normal survey conditions. The outstanding result was that risk communication efforts aimed at altering existing attitudes or strong emotional commitments are bound to fail. This may not be surprising for researcbers in the field of attitude cbange, but astounded most of the experts and politicians involved in our West German energy study. Risk sources that have undergone political polarization and extensive public debate have been socially transformed into carriers of symbolic beliefs. These beliefs are not related to the instrumental properties of risk sources. All information relating to the instrurnentaladvantages, disadvantages, and risks may be acknowledged, but will not trigger any attitude cbange because they do not affect the more powerful symbolic beliefs. 10 order to influence tbe symbolic belief systems, either value changes must occur or the issue must be disconnected from tbe previous symbols to which it has been associated. Both pathways of attitude change are unlikely to be affected by information programs. Direct visual evidence, events that cannot be over-looked, steady changes in social value structures, and even forgetting over the course of time are some of the social mechanisms to assure that changes in symbolic belief patterns take place (Meinefeldtl979) . The deliberate change of these patterns through official communication efforts will probably remain illusory.
The principal objective of risk communication should therefore not be to influence or alter people's attitudes towards risk sources, but to provide easily comprehensible tools to laypersons that enable them to understand information about risks, to process probabilistic information, and to evaluate the likely impacts for oneself and society. This goal suggests that the public perception of risk, at least the underlying concerns governing this perception, be adopted as another legitimate perspective for risk management, Scientific concepts of risk are not a priori superior to nonprofessional concepts. This does not mean that scientific estimates of probabilities and magnitudes of risk are only as accurate as laypersons' best guesses. On the contrary, most laypersons would not even tolerate a risk management strategy that relies not on the best available technical estimates but only on public perceptions. The legitimacy of public perception points to dimensions that need to be included when measuring and evaluating risk. The specific circumstances of the risk-related situation, equity issues, catastrophic potential, and other qualitative aspects of risk deserve the same attention as the calculation of numerical probabilities and consequences. Thus risk communication must incorporate a broad conception of risk, and operate with the realization that communication is a two-way process in which both sides should learn from each other.
The planning cell experience demonstrated the possibility of conveying the risk concept as well as the analytical techniques of risk assessment to a layperson audience. Given enough time and practice, nearly everyone in our 24 planning cells was able to become familiar with the probability concept and to contemplate trade.affs even in such sensitive areas as health versus costs. The process accomplished a basic understanding of the problems and choices of risk management, and thus laid the foundation for gaining trust and credibility. Although many respondents did not agree with the actual decisions regulators made in the past, they understood the basic rationale and accepted the agency's way of thinking, without necessarily endorsing or even approving of it. In particular, popular prejudices about hidden motives of politicians or the alleged insensitivity of industry towards pollution could be replaced with a critical , but conscious awareness olthe value conflicts and problems a politician, an administrator, or industrial manager faces when making risk-related decisions.
Effective strategies to design communication programs for conveying different risk concepts and enhancing understanding of the actors involved in risk management are certainly not easy to develop, but they are available. On the basis of our limited experiences with planning cells, successful communication programs appear to require three essential conditions:
1. Communication strategies should be carefully structured and prepared. Fac· tual in/ormation, interpretation of facts, opinions about expected outcomes, and evaluations of these outcomes should be treated separately and commu. nicated in a different format. Factual information should be collected and verified by experts with different attitudes. Facts can be reported to a lay audience by written or oral presentations. Interpretation of these racts should be presented in a plural form to reveal to the respondents that data can be interpreted differently without being unscientific or biased (Lynn 1986 The implications of the risk for the individual and society should be framed in an easily comprehensible yet honest manner. Underestimating the potential ability to understand the risk concept is just as detrimental to the communication process as overtaxing individuals with a scientific jargon that is unfamiliar to most people. The role of experts in communication has to be defined and structured in advance. Expert presentations should be kept brief and professional vanity should be avoided. Videotaping expert statements in controversial questions proved very successful in our communication contexts.
Communication strategies should be organized in a dialogue forum. The
audience must have the opportunity to voice its concerns to the communi· cators, to participate in selling the agenda, and to convey its perspective to the policy maker. Public involvement is not only a premise for reaching the public and gaining their attention, it is also a functional prerequisite for rational policy making. The perspective of the public helps to improve policies and decisions as the policy maker is more aware of the concerns and needs of the affected population. Therefore policy makers should be part of the communication strategy. They should express their willingness to learn from public concern and consider possibilities of using public input in the decision-making process. If policy makers are not willing to learn from the public, the public will probably refuse to learn from them as well.
tion of the tasks and problems of regulators and risk manogers. Such appreciation is the first step in creating or sustaining trust.
If policy makers are able to demonstrate the openness of the decision making process for incorporating public concern and to guarantee fairness and competence of the key actors in the decision process, trust may prevail even if the respondents do not agree with the trade-offs the decision maker has assigned to the conflicting attributes.
The process of communicating risk is certainly not easy, but our experiences in organizing and conducting planning cells assure us that important risk assessment and management strategies can be effectively communicated. Effective communication does not mean luring people into accepting risks that they fear or wish to avoid. Effective communication means preparing people to understand and to participate actively in debates about risk or risk sources. The major goals are to enhance understanding, to develop mutual respect for the key actors, and to acknowledge the conflicting values in decision making under uncertainty. Ultimately, risk communication should provide a platform for rational conflict resolution and democratic policy making.
